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  The entire life of al-Fārābī (259-339/870-950), who came to be 
known as the “Second Teacher”, Aristotle being the First, was dedicated to the 
essence of knowledge and to the the methods of obtaining knowledge. In the 
present text we will try to demonstrate how al-Fārābī’s concepts of 
knowledge and of epistemological process become the unifying elements of all 
major themes in the Muslim philosopher’s works - ontology, philosophy, 
religion, man, human community and the philosopher-prophet as the perfect 
ruler. 
In his works al-Fārābī poses two fundamental questions: how is it 
possible for man to gain knowledge and whether man can attain knowledge of 
an immaterial and transcendent being. The historical and conceptual context 
that frames al-Fārābī’s writings renders the answer to these questions even 
more complicated as the “Second Teacher” accommodates and reconciles in 
his philosophy diverse concepts of knowledge, stemming from diverging and 
conflicting sources. 
On the one hand, al-Fārābī relies on the textual background he shared 
with his Christian teachers, students and friends in the tenth-century 
Baghdad. On the whole, the philosophical circles in the Abbasid capital upheld 
the notion of a direct continuum between the Alexandrian school of late 
Antiquity and Baghdad. Al-Fārābī himself claimed to be a direct representative 
of the academic tradition of the school of Alexandria in Baghdad1. During his 
education he studied profoundly the writings of the “Firsts" and was deeply 
influenced by discussions and analyses of translated texts of Plato and 
Aristotle, their Neoplatonic commentators and the Neoplatonic writings, 
among them the pseudo-epigraphic writings of Aristotle2. 
In this context his epistemological intention embraced elements from 
Aristotelian cosmology and Neoplatonic concept of emanation3. On the other 
                                               
1 A critical review of sources, containing biographical and autobiographical notes about and by al-Fārābī, see: 
Steinschneider,  Alpharabius  1-11. Gutas, Biography 208-13.  
2 About the philosophical sources for his writings see: Walzer's introduction and commentary in Walzer, Al-
Fārābī on the Perfect State; Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect  7-34; Fakhry, Al-Fārābī, 
Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism 10-40. 
3 His friend and adherent is Abū Bishr Mattā (d. 329/940). Together with al-Fārābī he studied Aristotle’s 
writings. His student is Yaḥyā ibn ʽAdī (d. 362/972). Both of them, although in different periods, were actively 
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hand, the strong Neoplatonic influences that tinge his interpretation of the 
First Teacher – Aristotle – are intertwined with his desire to present the 
philosophical way of life as fully compatible with the religious values of Islam. 
In result, the philosopher’s vision was combined with his original teaching 
about the intellect and its role in his cosmology and concept of prophecy. 
 The intellect is the unifying element of the three fundamental human 
realities: the divinely created universe, the human nature and the life of the 
human community. The intellect organizes these three realities, they are its 
manifestations. The intellect is the common element, shared by the three of 
them. 
Al-Fārābī commences his analysis of the epistemological process with 
the superior reality and the cosmology of the supralunary world. The basic 
principle of his cosmology is the intellect. It constitutes the very substance of 
the First existent (al-mawjūd al-awwal). The First and the One is pure intellect 
and this intellect is not something different and outside the One4.  
The most essential characteristic of this intellect is its actuality. Its 
intellection is an eternal ongoing act of actual cognition, through which the 
First contemplates and thinks its substance and knows it. In this act of 
cognition the subject of cogitation, cogitation itself and the object of cogitation 
are the same5.  
The First, who holds the most superior position in the universe, is the 
One and only. At the same time, it is the eternal Source for the creation and the 
ultimate cause of every existence. The Second Intellect comes to existence 
through emanation from the One6. By contemplating the course of its being, it 
produces the Third Intellect. By thinking its own essence the Second produces 
a celestial body, which is called the First Heaven7. The dual thinking of the 
intellects is a productive act, which repeats itself and follows in a descending 
                                                                                                                                                       
involved in the translation process in the Abbasid capital and were prominent translators of Aristotle. Gutas, 
Greek Thought, Arabic Culture 145-47; Janos, Method , Structure, and Development 260-62.  
4 Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 70-1: “The First is an actual intellect by its substance.” 
5 An adapted reference to Aristotle’s concept of intelligence as developed in Book XII (Lambda) of his 
Metaphysics. Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 343; Merlan, Monopsychism 9.   
6 Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 94: "The substance of the First is a substance from which every 
existent emanates, however it may be, whether perfect or deficient".  
7 As regards the dynamics and nuances in the use of “celestial body”, “heaven” in particular as well as the 
cosmological and astronomical terms, employed by al-Fārābī, cf. Janos, Method, Structure, and Development 
115-19. 
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order. Thus, contemplating the First, each intellect generates the intellect on 
the next level. Contemplating its own essence, it begets a new celestial body.  
Thus, the world evolves into an ontological hierarchy where in 
descending order the lower in rank is emanating from the higher and follows 
it.  
The foundations of this emanation process are provided by the 
cogitation process, the intelligizing8 of the intellects. The intellects are ten in 
number, all of them being separate (mufāriqa) from matter and sharing a 
common object of contemplation – namely, the First. At the same time, each of 
them contemplates its own essence. In the hierarchy of being they are also 
called “secondary” (thawānī)9, as they hold the second rank in the organized 
cosmos (al-martaba ath-thānīya) by following the One. This First Cause for the 
existence of all things al-Fārābī identifies with God. The thawānī, in their part, 
are the causes for the existence of celestial bodies.   
Thus, the various levels of being are connected and ensue from each 
other by virtue of a hierarchic causality, in accordance with which the upper 
levels beget the lower ones and create an all-embracing cosmology. In this 
way the whole being follows six principles: the first reason, the secondary 
reasons, the Active Intellect, the soul, the form and the matter10.  
It is this process of emanation that performs the transition between the 
First Existent11, i.e. the One as a transcendental God, and the world, which is 
the realm of plurality. The dual object of contemplation of any of the intellects 
marks the transition from the first level of being, from the One, to the world of 
diversity and multiplicity, from the simple to the complex12. 
At the same time, the pure intellects13 attain their perfect existence in 
this dual cognitive process because they not only get to know themselves but 
                                               
8 Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 60. 
9 al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa 2. 
10 Ibidem. 
11 Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 56. 
12 al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa 2; English translation in McGinnis and Reisman, Anthology 82: "In the first level there 
cannot be many but rather only a single one. In each of the other grades, there are many". 
13 "But none of them [the ten intellects] is sufficient in itself to attain excellent existence by thinking its own 
essence only, but it acquires perfect excellence only by thinking together with its own essence the essence of 
the First Cause": Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 117; al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa 40; English translation in 
McGinnis and Reisman, Anthology  87: "It is as though the excellence of its being [secondary causes and the 
Active Intellect, M.M.] is completed only through the support of a certain multiplicity". 
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also come to realize the underlying reasons for their own existence as well as 
the otherworldly beginnings of each cognitive process. 
This cosmological chain strings into a hierarchical line ten pure and 
separate intellects and ends with the Active Intellect – al-῾aql al-fa῾ʽāl, which is 
the guiding principle of the sublunary world. All of them, in spite of lacking the 
imperfections, ensuing from matter and form, are nevertheless imperfect as 
they owe their existence to something that is more perfect than they are14. 
The closer they are to the First, the more perfect they are, and vice versa – the 
further away from it, the less perfect their existence is.  
The lower the level in this hierarchical structure, the more complex its 
constitution is. Accordingly, the Active Intellect is the least perfect one 
because it is at the remotest distance from the Prime Cause.  
Plurality is much more strongly expressed in its actions because in 
order to achieve its perfection it has to intelligize simultaneously three 
objects: The First, all the secondary causes and its own essence15. This is the 
main difference in comparison with the other intellects. Neither another 
intellect, nor another celestial body emanates from it. In spite of the fact that it 
occupies the lowest and the most remote level from God, the Active Intellect 
rules the sublunary world.  
From an epistemological standpoint that level in the hierarchy of being 
is the highest that can be achieved by man. The Active Intellect plays a central 
role in human knowledge because it connects with the rational human soul 
and only through this man can know the universe. 
 Human mind is limited by matter and cannot by itself attain knowledge 
about the transcendent reality. That is why it has to be assisted from the 
outside and taken away from the material world by the Active Intellect which 
gives it the primary knowledge as the necessary first step for achieving 
happiness16. The Active Intellect initiates the process of thinking in man 
becoming the primary source of thinking itself and every form of 
philosophical thinking in particular.  
                                               
14 al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa 40; English in McGinnis and Reisman, Anthology 86-7: "Their substance derive from 
something else and their existence is consequential to the existence of something else. The perfection of their 
substances does not extend so far that in themselves they do not need to receive existence from something 
else; it is rather the case that their existence is bestowed on them by something more perfect in existence 
than they are. This is a deficiency common to all existents other than the First". 
15 al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa 34. 
16 Ibid. 74. 
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Al-Fārābī defines the key role of the Active Intellect as „watching over 
the rational animal and endeavor to have him reach the highest level of 
perfection that man can reach“17. The relationship thus created between the 
Active Intellect and man is visualized by al-Fārābī by the religious image of the 
Holy Spirit (ar-rūḥ al-amīn, rūḥ al-quds)18. 
Through knowledge man steps up in the hierarchy of being, getting 
away from the material and close to God19. The Active Intellect serves as a 
mediator between man and the celestial hierarchy and as a link between the 
world of immaterial and material leading the potential human intellect to 
actuality.  
All human beings according to al-Fārābī have natural disposition called 
potential intellect - (ʽaql bi-l-quwwa) capable of abstracting forms from 
matters. By birth every man possesses it although it is undeveloped and weak 
in its initial stages. Al-Fārābī compares it to the limited capacity of a child to 
walk or to a weak and low flame that cannot set wood on fire20.  
The actualization of the capacity of the potential intellect occurs when it 
is illuminated by the Active Intellect. Describing the correlation between the 
Active Intellect and the human potential intellect al-Fārābī uses the metaphor 
of “light which the sun provides to the sight of the eye”21. 
By the medium of the Active Intellect the human intellect abstracts 
forms from the material things and receives them as objects of thinking. Al-
Fārābī calls these objects of thought intelligibles – ma῾qūlāt. They are forms 
abstracted from their matters. Before these universal forms were abstracted 
from their matters they are potential intelligibles. After their abstraction they 
become actual intelligibles. As actual objects of thought they acquire new level 
of being through reason and "they come to be among the existing things of the 
                                               
17 "῾ināya bi-l-ḥaywān al-nāṭiq": al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa 32; English by McGinnis and Reisman, Anthology  82. 
There is an obvious contrast between al-Fārābī's Active Intellect that is concerned with human soul and "the 
impassible Mind" in the Aristotle’s concept of the Intellect. For further details about combining Aristotelian 
and Neoplatonic interpretations of Active Intellect see: Fakhry, Al-Fārābī  75-6; on the role of the Aristotelian 
and Neoplatonic register of epistemology in the construction of Al-Farabi’s epistemology  see: Netton, Al-
Fārābī and His School 52-3. 
18 al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa 3; "Protective spirit" or "Holy spirit"in McGinnis and Reisman, Anthology  83. 
19 al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa  36. 
20 al-Fārābī, Iḥṣāʼ al-῾ulūm 37. 
21 al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa 35. 
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world and are connected, as intelligibles, among the totality of existing 
things”22. 
At this stage of the cognitive process the potential intellect that has 
acquired the first level of abstraction becomes an actual intellect – al-῾aql bi-l-
fi῾l. On this level man obtains knowledge of first intelligibles common to all 
men and that is the first step in his process of acquiring perfection and 
knowledge23.  
In the process of acquiring knowledge and perfection human intellect 
can master all forms of the existing world. Thus they are transformed into 
objects of thought for the actual human intellect, which in its turn reaches a 
new level of perfection and a higher level of abstraction. At that higher level it 
becomes acquired intellect – al-῾aql al-mustafād. Now the human intellect can 
reach abstract forms that are immaterial. As another kind of intelligibles these 
are forms that are always actual because they are never in matter. They refer 
to the First Cause and the whole hierarchal order of separate intellects ending 
with the Active Intellect24. Al-Fārābī does not say explicitly how these pure 
forms reach human intellect. It is clear however that they are coming directly 
as an emanation of the Active Intellect.  
This is suggested by the etymological connotation of the highest degree 
of human intellect – the acquired one. Thus we can explain the main difference 
between the Active Intellect and the other nine pure intellects: to achieve the 
perfection of its existence it has to intelligize three instead of two objects of 
thought. Through intelligizing the rest of the higher separate intellects it 
provides the human soul with knowledge of the hierarchical order of the 
universe to which it itself belongs. 
Here we are referred to the problem of self-knowledge that al-Fārābī 
formulates as the guiding principle in the organization of the universe. On its 
highest level as an acquired intellect the human mind repeats the cognitive act 
of the rest of the separate intellects. In this „ecstatic act of knowledge”25 it 
intelligizes itself and in the process of acquiring self-knowledge an identity 
between the knower and the known is achieved: 
                                               
22 al-Fārābī, Risāla fī l-ʽaql 20; translated into English in McGinnis and Reisman, Anthology 72. 
23 al-Fārābī, Risāla fī l-ʽaql 20; "The thing is intellected [yuʽqal] initially" means that the forms that are in 
matters are extracted from their matters and acquire another existence different from their initial existence": 
McGinnis and Reisman, Anthology 73; Dieterici, Alfārābī's philosophische Abhandlungen 71. 
24 al-Fārābī, Risāla fī l-ʽaql 13-6, 30-1. 
25 Merlan, Monopsychism 21. 
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 Man who is a potential intellect becomes an actual intellect in 
itself after he was not, and an object of thought in itself after he 
was not and he becomes a divine after being a material one26.  
 
Unlike the other separate intellects which produce in this way a lower 
ontological level human intellect is transformed into something different; it 
climbs up the hierarchy of being achieving similarity to the rest of the 
intellects (ṣāra shabīhan bi-l-ashīyāʼ al-mufāriqa27). Thus the acquired 
intellect becomes substance of man and operates as a link between the human 
intellect and the transcendental Active Intellect28. In this way the knowledge 
as an ontological concept is connected with the epistemological state of man.   
The final goal of human existence coincides with the final goal of man’s 
reason, i.e. to reach a state of an immaterial pure intellect29 and to devote 
human life to pure contemplation. The very stages of the epistemological 
process confirm the conclusion that human perfection is not something static 
but a process, an incessant progress in knowledge getting closer and closer to 
extreme happiness.  
Thus al-Fārābī corroborates the thesis that through reason man 
naturally enters a hierarchy that goes beyond his earthly existence. The 
highest goal of individual life is devotion to spiritual life, to immaterial and 
transcendent intelligible in order to achieve harmony with the whole.  
The individual human being becomes aware of himself as, on the one 
hand, a part of the cosmological hierarchy and, on the other hand, as a part of 
the community of man. Intellect and rational reasoning lead man to this 
harmony by intelligizing the three fundamental realities: created universe, 
human nature and human society. 
Al-Fārābī does not provide an unambiguous definition of happiness30. 
The alternative images of happiness share the common idea that the drive for 
                                               
26 al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa  36; English in McGinnis and Reisman, Anthology  84. 
27 Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 206; al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa 35.  
28 al-Fārābī, Risāla fī l-ʽaql 27. 
29 "Felicity means that the human soul reaches a degree of perfection in its existence where it is in no need of 
matter for its support, since it becomes one of the incorporeal things and of the immaterial substances and 
remains in that state continuously forever.":  English in Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 205.   
30 For different interpretations of the nature of happiness  see: Galston, The Theoretical and Practical 
Dimensions of Happiness 120-25.  
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its realization is an incessant process that mobilizes all mental and spiritual 
strengths of man. The final goal of human life lies beyond the material world 
because only the souls of those who have lived a spiritual life can survive in 
the afterlife31. Consequently what matters in this world is following the path 
to attain perfect knowledge which is the supreme happiness. The steps on this 
path are clearly outlined:  
 
Since what is intended by man’s existence is that he attains 
supreme happiness, he – in order to achieve it – needs to know 
what happiness is, make it his end, and hold it before his eyes. 
Then, after that, he needs to know the things he ought to do in 
order to attain happiness, and then do these actions32.  
 
The attainment of happiness is defined as a conscious moral choice 
mobilizing all spiritual strengths in assisting the rational part of human soul; 
as a result man consciously directs his actions to advance to the Good33.  
Thus al-Fārābī introduces in his concept of human intellect another 
subordination: the theoretical and the practical reason, the sole function of the 
latter is to serve the former one helping him to bring man to happiness34. 
Human happiness can be fully realized by achieving perfection of theoretical 
and practical reasoning; this can be accomplished by good actions which take 
place in society.  
The individual who is completely devoted to contemplation and is 
isolated from community of man is incapable to grasp the wholeness of the 
world. Only through interaction with other human beings he can overcome 
the limitations of individual existence and to become aware of his place in the 
big picture of the society and the world. Only through assistance by the others 
he can approach his own happiness because the innate disposition of every 
                                               
31 Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 262-63. 
32 al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa 78; into English translated by Fawzi Najjar in Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political 
Philosophy  35. 
33 al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa  73. 
34 Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 209. 
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single man is to join other human beings and to associate with other men35. 
Only within society he can fully develops the potential of his faculties36. 
The social framework where man can attain happiness is called by al-
Fārābī “the virtious city” (al-madīna al-fāḍila)37. In this society of excellence 
man can in cooperation with other men overcome the limitations of the 
individual life and to reach state of perfection through his inborn nature. This 
city is organized on the basis of the same metaphysical principles that 
organize the wholeness of being emanating from God 
The order and the various ranks in the political community symbolize 
the universal cosmos as a hierarchically structured and coherent whole38. The 
ontological hierarchy of the cosmos is reflected in the epistemological 
hierarchy of the virtuous city. All the citizens of the virtuous city are divided 
according to their ability to develop their virtue through participation in social 
life and their level of education.  Social hierarchy is a natural one since the 
position of every individual is predetermined according to his natural 
disposition to know and to learn things. Thus the natural hierarchy in the 
ideal virtuous society is a replica of the heavenly order39. It is derived from the 
epistemological hierarchy which contains a hierarchy of the sources and the 
methods of acquiring knowledge.  
The hierarchical structure of human knowledge is determined by the 
subject of each science and thus it is ontologically founded since the very 
structure of human knowledge mirrors the structure of the universe. The 
universe features both hierarchical order and coalescence due to the causality 
that links the separate levels of being. Likewise, the sciences are coalescent in 
terms of their object of study and at the same time their various branches 
stem out from each other in a causal sequence.  
Following this logic al-Fārābī puts philosophy on top of all sciences 
because its task, i.e. to give „account of the beings as they are perceived by the 
                                               
35 Mahdi, M. (trans.), Alfarabi's Philosophy 23. 
36 "Man belongs to the species that cannot accomplish their necessary affairs or achieve their best state, 
except through the association of many groups of them in a single dwelling -place.": English translation by 
Fauzi Najjar in Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy 32; al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa  69. 
37 Walzer, Al-Fārābī on the Perfect State 231. 
38 On the metaphysical background of the political community and its structural principles see: O’Meara, 
Platonopolis 187-89; Smirnov, Understanding Justice 288-92. 
39 al-Fārābī , Taḥṣīl al-saʽāda  24-5. 
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intellect with certain demonstrations40”, guarantees the foundation for the 
development of the other sciences whereas its method surpasses all the rest 
being the only path for obtaining certain knowledge about corporeal and 
incorporeal beings. All the other sciences are its subordinates.  
That is why the highest position in the virtuous city is specifically 
assigned to the Philosopher. Philosophers can grasp by themselves the idea of 
happiness and discover the means for its realization. Therefore they are the 
best citizens and occupy the upper ranks of society.  
The Philosopher is endowed with the highest theoretical and practical 
virtues, because for al-Fārābī real philosophy, in contrast to defective one 
(falsafa nāqiṣa41),  gives the real Philosopher the opportunity to intervene in 
the life of society by sharing his knowledge and helping others. All citizens of 
the virtuous city ought to have knowledge of the metaphysical truths about 
the First Cause, the separate intellects, the celestial spheres and so on until the 
natural bodies, the place of man in the universe and his connection with the 
Active Intellect42. The paths to obtaining such theoretical knowledge differ 
according to different intellectual capacities of men. The multitude of citizens 
needs teacher and instructor 43. 
Only the real Philosopher can answer this need and be the actual ruler of 
the virtuous community. As such he has achieved the perfection of his 
theoretical wisdom. His intellect, becoming an acquired one, is capable of 
contemplating the Active Intellect. Only when man attains this highest rank 
and when there is no intermediary between him and the Active Intellect his 
acquired intellect becomes matter for the Tenth celestial intellect – the Active 
one. He is the mediator that passes on the revelation from God to man. Al-
Fārābī writes:  
 
This emanation that proceeds from the Active Intellect to the 
passive through the mediation of the acquired intellect, is 
revelation. Now  because the Active Intellect emanates from the 
being of the First Cause, it can for this reason be said that it is the 
First Cause that brings about revelation to this man through the 
                                               
40 Ibid. 83; into English by Mahdi, Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle 41. 
41 al-Fārābī , Taḥṣīl al-saʽāda  87. 
42 Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State 276-78; al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Milla  44-5. 
43 al-Fārābī, as-Siyāsa 78. 
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mediation of the Active Intellect. The rule of this man is the 
supreme rule; all other human rulerships are inferior to it and 
are derived from it44. 
 
This person becomes a Prophet when the Active Intellect has an impact on 
another faculty of his soul – the faculty of representation, which is “extremely 
powerful45" and developed to perfection in him. The main activity of this 
faculty of imagination is to receive the intelligibles by representing or 
imitating them. Through his perfect imagination the Prophet transforms the 
metaphysical truths in images, in stories and in symbols in order to persuade 
and instruct those less perfect than him in grasping the intellectual truths. The 
language of imagination, imitation and persuasion is the language of religion. 
For example in order to be better understood by the ordinary people the 
process of revelation and the transformation of the human intellect can be 
translated in religious symbols and images and may be presented in the 
encounters of the Prophet with the Angel of Revelation – Jibrīl.  
The Philosopher-prophet directly receives the revealed laws of God that 
should organize the life of human community. He is the lawgiver as well as the 
ruler who knows how to use theoretical wisdom to promote the happiness of 
the community and knows the means how to attain this goal. So the 
Philosopher-prophet is not the passive thinker withdrawn from active social 
life - on the contrary, he acts as an organizing and structuring principle of the 
society.  
Within the Philosopher-prophet al-Fārābī incorporates the main 
characteristics of the true philosopher of Plato and the prophet of Islam; that 
suggests that his basic intention was to integrate two different concepts of 
knowledge and to provide a coherent and universal epistemological 
framework.  
 Combining two completely different epistemologies, al-Fārābī reconciles 
their controversies and creates an universal paradigm of human knowledge. It 
provides the unifying pattern for all the major themes of his philosophical 
legacy. 
In a challenging and provocative fashion for his contemporaries al-Fārābī 
wants to "rationalize" religion and provide a philosophical explanation of 
prophecy. He believes that philosophy and religion comprise the same 
                                               
44 al-Fārābī, as-Siyāsa 79-80; English by Najjar in Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy  36-7. 
45 Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State 223. 
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subjects and deal with the same reality46. Religion however serves philosophy  
because it is only its imitation. Religion deals with "opinions and actions, 
determined and restricted with stipulations and prescribed for a community 
by their first ruler"47. Consequently it is for the masses since their intellect 
finds it difficult to grasp the principles of beings, their hierarchy and the real 
goal of human life. So masses rely on imitations of the real knowledge as the 
only way to come closer to it.   
Through this relation between philosophy and religion al-Fārābī 
reproduces the dynamics of a deep cultural transformation within Muslim 
society in X century. Philosophy has ceased to be a servant of religion as was 
its role at the time of al-Kindī (d. ca. 252/866). It has emancipated from 
theological discourse. Inspired by the Greek Classics al-Fārābī persuaded his 
contemporaries that philosophy is not only an autonomous science but is also 
an universal one. Being the oldest science it preceded religion. In the course of 
history philosophy had been embraced by the most enlightened and best 
developed societies. A permanent body of universal philosophical knowledge 
had been preserved and transferred by the Chaldeans, the Ancient Egyptians, 
the Greeks, the Syrians and the Arabs48. 
Although al-Fārābī mentions particular societies devoted to philosophy he 
does not make clear whether the virtuous city ruled by the Philosopher-
prophet  had existed in the past or existed in his own epoch. Bearing in mind 
the uncertainty and instability of his own times we may suggest that the 
period of the early umma ruled by the Prophet Muḥammad and the rule of the 
Four Righteous Caliphs may be considered as an exemplary of this political 
ideal.  
Al-Fārābī's understanding that the ultimate happiness can be attained in the 
afterlife but only as a result of the efforts of man during his earthly existence 
bears the mark of the conflict between the two major tendencies in his 
thought - the demand to surpass the limitations of the material world and the 
demand to engage man in its organization. It is the concept of the perfect 
political order of the virtuous city governed by the Philosopher-prophet that 
fully reconciles all these tensions. Thus his philosophical pathos leads to a 
unified vision of the structure of all beings culminating in a social utopia with 
                                               
46 al-Fārābī , Taḥṣīl al-saʽāda  89. 
47 al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Milla 43; into English translated by Butterworth, Alfarabi: The Political Writings  93. 
48 al-Fārābī , Taḥṣīl al-saʽāda  86. 
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an epistemological foundation that not only his contemporaries but every 
community of men should strive for. 
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